Step 2 of 4•18 minutes read
Planning Prior to Entering a High-Risk Area
A risk assessment is used in various situations onboard to identify potential hazards and risk factors that may cause harm, analyze and evaluate the risks associated with the hazards, and determine the best course of action to eliminate the hazards or control the risks if the hazard cannot be eliminated. With that said, a risk assessment is carried out for security threats to identify the appropriate ship protective measures to be put in place to minimize the hazards imposed by the threat when a ship is to transit to a high-risk area. When a threat is looked at like a fire triangle, it is also formed of 3 parts:
Intent
Capability
Opportunity
Both the intent and capability cannot, unfortunately, be mitigated by the ship Master or CSO (Company Security Officer), but opportunity can.
Capability for piracy and armed robbery means the equipment and physical means that the attackers have to carry out the attack, such as weapons and personal strength. The intent is the purpose for why the attack is being carried out. This depends on every single attacker. Whilst opportunity is the ability to commit the attack, and this depends on the ship's protective measures in place.
Threat Factors.
The risk assessment is therefore a fundamental part of passage planning. All voyages to be taken require thorough and advanced planning and a risk assessment using all the available information. The risk being evaluated should include but not be limited to the likelihood of harm to the crew or ship from attack by pirates and armed robbers. Additionally, it must reflect the prevailing characteristics of the specific voyage, ship, and operations. Therefore it should be different when a ship is transiting various areas.
Like the Ship Security Assessment (SSA) required by the ISPS Code, the risk assessment for piracy and armed robbery when being carried out should include, but may not be limited to the following considerations:
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The potential areas of increased threat or risk.
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The reasons behind the armed robbery or piracy taking place such as who the pirates are and what they aim to achieve, how they attack, how they board, and what weapons they use.
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Background factors shaping the situation such as visibility, sea state, and traffic.
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Possibility of cooperation with military or other security services.
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The specific ship characteristics and vulnerabilities to withstand the threat such as freeboard, speed, and others.
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The Ship and Company procedures such as drills, training, and decision-making processes.
Statutory requirements, in particular those of the flag or the coastal state, should be considered when the risk assessment is being carried out. Every time a risk assessment is put into place, additional mitigation measures that may be required to prevent an attack can be identified.
Company Plan Prior to Transiting a High-Risk Area
Company planning before a ship transits an area of increased risk is of extreme importance. This will allow the company to carry out a risk assessment and weaken the risk of the attack. When doing so, it is important to keep in mind at all times that piracy and armed robbery attacks defer across regions. The following should be included in the company’s planning:
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Registering the ship with the relevant reporting centre.
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Obtaining the latest threat and risk information from the designated regional sources.
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Reviewing the Ship Security Assessment (SSA) and the Ship Security Plan (SSP).
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Ensuring that ship protection measures are put in place.
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Monitoring of piracy-related websites for news about the latest threats.
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Offering guidance to the Master about the recommended route.
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Planning to maintain the security of critical information to avoid it from falling in the wrong hands.
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Submitting the appropriate reporting and registration forms.
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Due diligence of companies providing security services.
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Considering the use of hidden position transmitting devices since hijackers will often disable all visible communication and tracking devices and aerials immediately.
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Reviewing company manning requirements.
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Considering disembarkation of non-essential crew and families before sailing to areas of high risk.
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Checking the crew training plans.
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Reviewing the threat assessment and security measures for the location of STS operations when these are to be undertaken.
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Reviewing the threat assessment and security measures for the location of Offshore Terminals.
Ship's Plan Prior to Transiting a High-Risk Area
The ship's Master should have a plan before entering a high-risk area. Like the company plan, this is done to ensure that the risks of attacks are mitigated.
The training of the crew is an important factor to be taken into account. The Master should therefore schedule a drill and training before transiting such areas. Additionally, the crew should be made aware of the threats and their consequences. A briefing should be carried out highlighting the procedure to be followed in case of an emergency, the alarm that will be used, and the security duties to being carried out by each individual. The drill should test the following:
- The ship's protective measures.
- The security of all access points.
- Lockdown conditions (Citadel).
- The bridge team's security knowledge and crew awareness.
- The crew's understanding of required action in the event of such an attack.
- The testing of the SSAS (Ship Security Alert System).
Additional to the drills and briefings, emergency communications should be prepared and tested accordingly. A draft of an emergency message should be prepared, and essential emergency contacts should be displayed near the external communication stations including the one in the Citadel. The SSAS (Ship Security Alert System) should also be checked, a specific time is usually agreed upon by the company and the master onboard to carry out such a test.
AIS should remain switched on throughout passages when transiting in the VRA (Voluntary Reporting Areas) to ensure that the reporting centres and military forces can track the ship. The data provided should be restricted to the ship’s identity, position, course, speed, navigational status, and safety-related information. Therefore, information regarding the voyage and next port of call should be kept blank.
If the ship is to go to an anchoring position, the master should try to keep the time at anchor to a minimum. An anchor watch should be maintained at all times and additional deck patrols should be established at irregular intervals. The Master should also plan the procedures before and upon entering the Voluntary Reporting Areas.
The Master should:
- Obtain the latest threat information.
- Check the latest NAVAREA warnings, alerts, and the Inmarsat SafetyNet broadcasts.
- Implement the VRA ship registration and reporting requirements.
- Confirm arrangements with the Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC), if such services are to be used.
- Confirm a rendezvous position and communication plan for the Security Escort Vessels, if used.
- Ensure that a contingency plan is in place if a security service does not arrive.
- Confirm that propulsion can operate at full speed.
- Implement all the security measures highlighted in the Ship Security Plan (SSP).
The Master should:
- Submit the ship reports.
- Update and monitor the latest threat information.
- Ensure that all the access points are limited, controlled, and properly secured.
- Minimize the use of VHF and use email or a secure satellite telephone instead.
- Where possible, only answer known or legitimate callers on the VHF and avoid giving information with regards to the ship, crew, cargo, and voyage.
- All work outside of the accommodation is to be strictly controlled.
- All-access points should be limited and controlled.
- All Engine Room essential equipment should be immediately available at all times.
- No maintenance is to be carried out on essential equipment.
The speed and manoeuvring will be another factor considered by the ship's Master. Increasing the speed will make it more difficult for an attacker to board. Therefore, the engines should be ready for immediate manoeuvre at all times.
When navigating in such areas, the ships should spend as little time as possible stationery, drifting, or operating at low speeds, especially when working close to shore. If a ship is to be stationary, the use of protected anchorages, if available, should be considered. With that said, it is important to recognize that the standards of protection of such anchorage areas vary widely.
A daily position report is to be submitted to the relevant reporting centre when navigating inside a VRA (Voluntary reporting Area) and ships are strongly encouraged to do so via email or fax since this will provide the latest ship's position.